TAMPA, FLORIDA - NOVEMBER 30: Head coach Jonathan Gannon of the Arizona Cardinals looks on from the sidelines during the fourth quarter of an NFL football game against the Tampa Bay Buccaneers at Raymond James Stadium on November 30, 2025 in Tampa, Florida. (Photo by Kevin Sabitus/Getty Images) | Getty Images
I’m not sure whether Jonathan Gannon will be a good, poor, or medium defensive coordinator for the Green Bay Packers. It is, in fact, virtually impossible to tell how good or bad any defensive coordinator is without an insanely long track record. Jeff Hafley coordinated the seventh-best defense in the NFL (by DVOA) in 2024, and then, with Micah Parsons, the Packers fell to 14th. And then once Parsons got hurt, they fell to 28th, finishing 19th overall when you average everything out.
So, did Jeff Hafley do a good job? I have no earthly idea. The Miami Dolphins apparently thought so, and maybe they’re right! But I don’t like to pretend I know things when I don’t, and I’m just not sure. The fundamental problem for all DCs is that so much is out of their control.
The New England Patriots — who, as you may know, are going to the Super Bowl — finished the season ranked 23rd in defensive DVOA. They finished 11th in EPA per play. They finished fourth in Points Against. The difference lies in the fact that the DVOA adjusts for the quality of the opponent faced, and the other two metrics do not, and while the Patriots’ defense got results, they got them against the Raiders, The Panthers (Young was either benched or hurt partway through), Saints, Titans, Browns, Falcons, Jets (2x), Bengals with Jake Browning, Giants, Ravens with mostly Tyler Huntley, and the Dolphins led by Quinn Ewers. That is an absolutely TERRIBLE slate of offenses. Is defensive coordinator Terrell Williams a genius? Was he secretly terrible? Or can we just not tell?
And of course, the DC doesn’t control which players they have. That’s up to the front office in terms of drafting and acquisition, and God, in the form of injuries. It’s not Jeff Hafley’s fault that Jaire Alexander is a big weirdo, that they got Micah Parsons, that they lost Micah Parsons, that they lost Devonte Wyatt, or that Keisen Nixon turned into a trash-talking pumpkin.
All of that said, I do believe (and I think everyone would agree) that there are good and bad defensive coordinators. Vic Fangio has a long track record of generating outstanding results, and I’m confident that he is a good defensive coordinator. In my opinion, the best current DC is Brian Flores in Minnesota, which brings me to my point. I don’t think the underlying scheme of any given DC really matters that much, and that all have merit if run properly. Instead, I think two overarching philosophies exist among DCs, and I have boiled them down to the following mathematical equations. Both equations assume you stop the run at a non-terrible rate. They are:
I think of the Passive Model in terms of the old Cover-2 shell, or Tampa-2, though that is hardly the only example, but it’s easy to understand. In the classic Cover-2, the safeties prevent splash plays, they force/tempt all passes to be targeted underneath, and rely on sure tackling to prevent big YAC gains. If you have a strong front four or a Brian Urlacher eating up the middle of the field, so much the better. This model made a lot of sense for a long time, however it made MUCH MORE sense when teams made more mistakes, and there has been a league-wide trend towards more conservative, mistake-free ball over the last 40 years, which has really ramped up of late.
The last time the
NFL’s league-wide completion percentage was below 60% was in 2006, when it topped out at 59.8%, and in fact, 2007 was a turning point for passing as the league hit 61.2%, and has not fallen below 60% again to date. In 2020, the league average hit 65.2%, and has not fallen below 64% since. The league has been consistently moving towards a higher completion percentage over time, representing a general move towards more conservative play. In 2010, the league-wide interception percentage hit 3% for the final time, and in 2025, it reached a historic low of 2.2%. But all of this conservative play has come at a cost.
Explosive plays have declined as completion percentage has increased. Way back in 1972, the average completion was 13.2 yards, which is also the last time it was over 13. In 1991, the league hit 12 yards per completion for what is likely the second-last time, as it has only exceeded this mark once since, in the offensively insane 2011 season. Since then, it’s been consistently over 11 yards per completion, until 2022, when it fell to 10.9, where it has remained to this day.
Picks are down, completions and completions percentage are up, and explosive plays are down, and these trends seem to be continuing, which means that the passive model isn’t as useful as it once was, and this is why my admiration for the Flores system has grown. Flores’ defense rushes four defenders less than any other defense in the league, and so it is the least predictable pass rush in the league. Doing any sort of film study against Minnesota is a nightmare because of the volume of possible combinations. It’s not just about identifying “the blitz,” but about identifying whether it will be a five, six, or seven (or a few times this year, eight) people coming at you, who the rushers will be, and where to fire off your hot route while making sure that a sneaky down lineman hasn’t dropped into your passing lane. And just when you think you see seven people coming, all of a sudden, all but three drop off into coverage.
The Flores defense isn’t perfect, of course, as no defense is, but it’s consistently outstanding. The Vikings finished
third in defensive DVOA this year despite a disastrous offense frequently putting them in terrible situations. They finished second in 2024 as well, and first against the pass. And while that defense certainly has some talent on it, their highest ranking player per PFF was Jonathan Greenard with a very medium 74.2. The outstanding (but comparable)
Houston Texans defense had six players graded higher, including three in the 80s or 90s.
More than anything, I think there is some good evidence, buried in the Vikings, and to a lesser extent, the Bears and blitz-happy Dennis Allen (whose Bears led the league in turnover differential), that while Passive Model defenses are only as good as their constituent parts, that the Active Model defenses CAN create improvement via scheme, at least a bit.
And I’m not sure what Jonathan Gannon is, at least yet, but once we get a look and hear more on his philosophy, this is the framework I’ll be using. And I don’t even necessarily think this is entirely a this-or-that situation. I think one reason Jeff Hafley’s defense was better without Micah Parsons in 2024 is that he was forced to be Active to create a pass rush, whereas with Parsons in 2025, he could remain passive and still get a pass rush. But it’s much easier to plan for Micah Parsons than it is for “a bunch of random crap I scheme up,” and so, even though Parsons is incredible, they were still worse overall.
Perhaps, at some point, the league will shift back to a more explosive, less careful offensive norm, but until then, passive defenses will struggle, as offenses stay content to pick them apart with high-percentage passes. I very much hope the next man up is aggressive and risk-preferring. Losing slowly is still losing.
