Milwaukee Bucks
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The chapter of errors, part II: 15 biggest mistakes by the Milwaukee Bucks (2002–2025)
Source: https://www.brewhoop.com/bucks-feat...pj-tucker-jason-kidd-monta-ellis-andrew-bogut
12. The “savings” that cost dearly: letting go of P.J. Tucker (2021)
On every championship team, there are players whose statistics are not outstanding, but their impact on the game and team spirit is immense. For the 2021 Milwaukee Bucks, P.J. Tucker was such a guy. This tough forward joined the team in the final stretch before that season’s playoffs and became the missing link: he defended like a rabid pitbull (especially his memorable battles with Kevin Durant in the conference semifinals—Durant did score astronomical numbers, but Tucker stayed glued to him, making every contact and the trash-talk miserable), he added charisma to the locker room, and he occasionally stretched the floor with a timely corner-three. In short, he was the heart and claws of the team that won the championship. Fans loved his tenacity; images from the title celebration (Tucker with a cigar and champagne bottle yelling “we dogs!”) went down in Bucks history. It seemed obvious that the club should do everything to keep such a player.
But then came the summer of 2021 and free agency. Tucker was 36, his contract was expiring. Yes, his physical prime was behind him, but his value as a specialist was still enormous. His demands were not excessive—he was looking for a two-year deal. The Bucks, however, did not make him a sensible offer. In fact, they let him walk without a fight as if they decided he had fulfilled his role and could be replaced by a cheaper equivalent. Tucker quickly signed with the Miami Heat for about $15m over 2 years. Meanwhile, Milwaukee settled for additions like Rodney Hood, Semi Ojeleye, and Grayson Allen, each with certain advantages, but none with Tucker’s toughness and experience.
Officially, Bucks GM Jon Horst explained that the financial situation (luxury tax) was difficult. Indeed, if Milwaukee had matched the offer for Tucker, the luxury tax costs would have jumped significantly. From a fan’s perspective at the time, however, it looked like strange cheapness when you have a team at the top. After all, what are savings worth when you’re hunting for more rings? Tucker later openly said in interviews that he felt unwanted by the Bucks—that they didn’t even give him a serious contract proposal. It’s kind of like inviting someone to a royal feast and then telling them to leave through the back door without dessert.
The 2021–22 season brought a brutal confirmation of fears: the Bucks lacked someone like Tucker. In the second round of the playoffs, they faced the Boston Celtics and fought a seven-game war without an important soldier, and worse, without the injured Middleton as well. Defensively, they did alright, but in the crucial Game 7, they lacked the experience and “glue” in the person of Tucker. His successors failed: Ojeleye didn’t pan out at all and was off the team before the playoffs, and Grayson Allen—though he brought a three-point shot—became a target for opponents on defense. The Celtics mercilessly exploited this, running plays at Allen and forcing him to defend Jayson Tatum or Jaylen Brown. One can only wonder what would have happened if Tucker had been on the court in those moments, with his strength, cunning, and mental resilience.
One scene stuck in my mind: Game 7 in Boston, Grant Williams hit seven threes because the Bucks consistently sagged off him, focusing on the stars. If Tucker had been there, he probably would have kicked some ass in the locker room during halftime for such a strategy, or thrown himself at Williams to contest the shot. Without him, there was no defensive leader on the court and no mental leader off it. The Bucks lost the series, and some fans complained: “If P.J. was here, he wouldn’t have let that happen.”
To make matters worse, Tucker showed in Miami that he was still very useful—in the 2021–22 season, he had a career-best three-point shooting percentage (42%), and the Heat reached the Eastern Conference Finals. The Bucks were eliminated one round earlier, fighting bravely, but something was still missing. Of course, Middleton (injury) was the biggest loss, but Tucker’s role was also undeniable.
The decision not to keep P.J. Tucker is a “penny-wise, pound-foolish” mistake. A few million were saved, but the team lost a player who could have helped win another championship. Even Giannis seemed dissatisfied—he publicly said he understood the business, but it’s hard to imagine he wouldn’t have preferred to have Tucker back by his side in the fight.
Therefore, it’s placed 12th in our ranking—a mistake that might not have been as harmful in the long run as giving away a young star or a missed high draft pick, but painful because it concerned a championship roster. The Bucks learned here that sometimes it’s not worth being stingy. The championship window can be short, and every piece of the puzzle is valuable. Tucker might have been marginal in stats (averaging around 4.0 PPG in the 2021 playoffs), but his contribution was priceless. Milwaukee learned this the hard way, retrospectively.
11. Kidd chaos: hiring Jason Kidd as coach (2014–18)
When newly molded Milwaukee Bucks owners (Wes Edens and Marc Lasry) announced Jason Kidd’s hiring as head coach in the summer of 2014, many fans rubbed their eyes in disbelief. Kidd was indeed a legend as a player, had just retired, and had one season of coaching experience with the Brooklyn Nets—a season full of drama, intrigue, and mixed results. Moreover, his arrival in Milwaukee occurred amidst scandal: the Bucks still had a valid contract with coach Larry Drew, but the new owners had secretly agreed with Kidd (a private friend of Lasry’s) and bought him out from the Nets for two second-round picks! Yes, they gave up picks for a coach. Drew was fired almost without warning—he learned everything from a message on his phone. The Kidd era was beginning, presented as a “young coaching genius will lead talented young Bucks.” It was supposed to be beautiful, but it turned out… well.
At first, it actually seemed like Kidd was a miracle worker. In the 2014–15 season, Milwaukee jumped from 15 wins to 41—they made the playoffs (with a .500 record, but still). Kidd changed the team’s style: he introduced aggressive full-court defense, lots of double-teams, and traps—in the first season, it surprised opponents. Young players like Giannis Antetokounmpo and Khris Middleton appreciated Kidd’s energy. It seemed the experiment was succeeding. However, in subsequent years, the charm wore off. Kidd’s innovative defense turned out to be one-dimensional. When the league adjusted and began breaking down the Bucks’ presses with quick passes to open shooters, the Milwaukee team suddenly became one of the worst defenses in the league. Over four years, the Bucks’ defensive rating dropped from second place in 2015 to 19th in 2018—the opposite evolution expected from a coach considered a defensive specialist.
Kidd also became famous for controversial motivational methods. His “reign” was often described as dictatorial; he introduced elements of military drill. The “Christmas training” story in 2014 became widely discussed: the day before Christmas Eve, after a loss in a “winnable” game against Charlotte, Kidd decided his players didn’t deserve free holidays. Despite protests, he ordered a 9 a.m. practice on Christmas Eve. It wasn’t a normal practice—it was a three-hour ordeal: interval running, wind sprints, like at a college basketball camp. Players were staggering from exhaustion; reportedly, some were throwing up. Kidd swore at them (calling them “a parody of professionals,” etc.), and he particularly picked on Larry Sanders, verbally humiliating him and blaming him for the loss. Imagine this: Christmas Eve, most people are thinking about dinner and family, and Bucks players are doing sprints until they vomit because the coach decided to teach them a “lesson.” The result? Sanders had a mental breakdown a few days later, which probably accelerated his retirement from playing a few weeks later (see the previous point on our list), and the remaining players resented Kidd.
This wasn’t his only stunt. Kidd was known for unconventional, perhaps insane, methods. As Nets coach a year earlier, he infamously had his player bump him to spill a drink and get an illegal timeout (“spill gate”)—seemingly clever, but the league punished him for it. In Milwaukee, it was less spectacular but more toxic. Kidd often publicly criticized his players, pointing out their mistakes in the media. Young Giannis later recalled that he learned a lot from Kidd, but there were extreme moments—for example, after Giannis’s triple-double at a young age, Kidd coldly stated at a conference: “he played terribly, all bad decisions, a triple-double means nothing if we lose.” Such tough love might work for some, but many Bucks players had enough.
The locker room was boiling, though not everyone immediately showed it. Information surfaced about a growing conflict between Kidd and some veterans. When the team in the 2017–18 season got stuck around .500, patience wore thin. In January 2018, Kidd was abruptly fired. Reportedly, Giannis—Kidd’s favorite—even wanted to call club officials to defend the coach, but he was advised against it. The decision was firm: enough chaos, enough unpredictability. Assistant Joe Prunty took over the team for the rest of the season, and Mike Budenholzer was hired in the summer. What happened next? The Bucks immediately became a powerhouse: the best NBA record in the 2018–19 season, Giannis won MVP, and the team’s playing style finally adapted to its talents (stretched offense, sensible defense). The contrast with the Kidd era was enormous.
So why is Jason Kidd’s hiring on our list of mistakes? It was a move based more on hopes and connections than on actual reasons. Milwaukee gave up picks for a rookie coach and gave him power not only on the bench but also in personnel decisions: Kidd influenced trades—it was during his tenure that several questionable moves were made, such as trading Knight for MCW, which (spoiler alert) we’ll discuss shortly. In a way, the organization became hostage to the coach’s unstable character. The final effect: a few years of wasted team development (because although Giannis developed, the team as a whole stagnated), some players alienated, the club’s reputation tarnished (league whispers about strange methods, with a smirk). One could argue that Kidd helped in the first stage of rebuilding—after all, they made the playoffs in 2015. But from the perspective of 2025, it’s clear that if Budenholzer had arrived 2–3 years earlier, the Bucks could have contended for the highest goals sooner.
Jason Kidd in Milwaukee is synonymous with unfulfilled potential and unnecessary drama. He started experiments like “Giannis as a point forward,” which eventually paid off, but there were just as many unsuccessful ideas, such as prioritizing ineffective players at the expense of promising ones (there was a time he favored older players over Malcolm Brogdon or Thon Maker—yes, he reportedly pushed for Maker in the draft too). In any case, hiring Kidd and sticking with him for so long is counted as a mistake. 11th on our list, because although the costs were mainly intangible (lost time and a lot of bad taste), it’s hard not to include a move that could have derailed the Bucks’ future more than we might realize. Suffice it to say that Giannis genuinely liked Kidd—when he was fired, he was in shock. If the Greek Freak had rebelled then or demanded a trade (as NBA stars can do), it would have been a tragedy. Fortunately, nothing of the sort happened, and the Bucks moved forward. Kidd got a second chance in Dallas and has already caused some commotion there too. Better he mess up other teams—that’s what Bucks fans sighed when the Kidd mania in Milwaukee finally ended.
10. All-Star for peanuts? The Andrew Bogut for Monta Ellis trade (2012)
Let’s shift for a moment to 2012. The Milwaukee Bucks were stuck in mediocrity—every season, they hovered around the playoff line, sometimes making it as an eighth seed, sometimes not. On the roster, scorer Brandon Jennings shone, but the true “face” of the team was still Andrew Bogut, the no. 1 pick of the 2005 draft, a center who was supposed to be a pillar for years. Bogut played solidly; in 2010, he even made the Third Team All-NBA (judged to be the third-best center in the league that year), but plagued by injuries, he couldn’t fully spread his wings. The worst was in April 2010: a horrific broken hand and dislocated elbow after a fall, which ruled him out of those playoffs and left a permanent mark. Then more ankle problems. In 2012, Bogut was again recovering from a serious injury (broken ankle), and the Bucks decided it was time for a change. Unfortunately, the way these changes were made ranks among the club’s biggest blunders.
In March of that lockout-shortened season, Milwaukee agreed with the Golden State Warriors on a trade: Andrew Bogut and Stephen Jackson (a frustrated player whom the Bucks had acquired a few months earlier and had already managed to fall out with coach Skiles) went to the Warriors. In return, the Bucks received Monta Ellis, Ekpe Udoh, and Kwame Brown. On paper, it looked like a move that 1) cleared the air by getting rid of Jackson, 2) changed the team’s profile—a big man was traded for a dynamic perimeter player. Monta Ellis was then known as a brilliant scorer, averaging 20+ points per game in Golden State, although that didn’t necessarily translate into wins. Furthermore, Ellis was known for a rather inefficient style: many shots, little defense, problems with off-ball play. But the Bucks thought: paired with Jennings, he’ll create the league’s smallest (but fastest) backcourt! Indeed, both measured around 6’1”, which promised trouble defending taller opponents. However, this was brushed aside: “just score more points!”
The result? “Monta Ellis has it all” – this famous phrase from the press conference after the trade, when a reporter asked what Monta would bring to the Bucks, and he replied in his characteristic style: “I have it all,” meaning he possessed everything: shooting, passing, defense. Unfortunately, it quickly turned out to be empty boasting. The Bucks did finish the 2011–12 season at a decent level (at the time of the trade, they were 10th in the East, finishing just outside the playoffs, but close), and Monta had some good games. But the whole Jennings-Ellis experiment failed. In the 2012–13 season, the Bucks again finished eighth in the East, barely making the postseason. Monta Ellis averaged over 19 points and six assists per game, but he shot 41% from the field and a dismal 28% from three—to put it mildly, efficiency lagged. With Jennings, they formed one of the least economical pairs in the league: both loved to shoot, but neither exceeded 40-41% from the field. Two low-efficiency scorers, no sharpshooter: a recipe for mediocrity.
The Bucks crashed out in the first round of the 2013 playoffs against LeBron James’s Miami Heat and were swept 0-4, like a mosquito swatted by a newspaper. Ellis couldn’t make a difference—in the series, he averaged under 15 points per game, missing shots in streaks. After the season, he exercised his option to exit his contract; the Bucks offered an extension of $36m over three years, he declined—and ultimately signed for similar money in Dallas. In Milwaukee, only a bad taste and a question remained after Monta: did they really give up Bogut for this?
Let’s look at the other side of the trade. Andrew Bogut, after rehabilitation, joined the Warriors in the 2012–13 season. He might not have been as offensively potent as before, but he became a defensive pillar for the young Oakland team. The Warriors began to build championship potential—Bogut handled the dirty work in the paint, passed excellently, set countless screens for Curry and Thompson. In 2015, he won an NBA championship with Golden State as their starting center, and reached another Finals a year later. His impact wasn’t always visible in stats (he didn’t need points to dominate defensively), but he was crucial for those Warriors. So, one could say the Bucks gifted the Warriors a missing piece of a dynasty. And what did they get in return? A few Monta Ellis highlights and a trophy for “first-round sweep.”
Looking back, a center with All-NBA defensive potential (when healthy) was given away for a low-efficiency backcourt that never made sense. The Bucks might as well have put up a banner saying “we want to be mediocre at all costs.” At that time, owner Herb Kohl disliked the word “rebuild”—he preferred fighting for eighth place over tanking. This trade perfectly symbolized that: instead of waiting out Bogut’s injury and trying to rebuild with him (or possibly trade him for more elsewhere), they went for a trade that was supposed to provide an immediate fireworks injection. Did it? Perhaps for a week, there was excitement about Monta in Milwaukee—to this day, some remember his spectacular drives to the basket—but ultimately, nothing lasting came of it.
To make matters worse, they also gave away a 2012 draft pick with Bogut (which happened to be theirs from previous moves)—the Warriors received the no. 7 pick in the 2012 draft. While they didn’t make the best use of that pick (they chose Harrison Barnes, a solid player, but not a star), the Bucks didn’t even have a chance to benefit. Ekpe Udoh and Kwame Brown, whom Milwaukee received, also contributed nothing. Udoh was a stopgap for two years, Kwame played a total of 12 more games and retired. Stephen Jackson? He played maybe 20 minutes total for the Warriors, who promptly released him, but for the Bucks, that was a plus, as he was a locker room cancer.
The assessment of this blunder from the Bucks’ perspective is evident: they turned the Warriors into a powerhouse, but they got stuck in the mud. Okay, maybe that’s an exaggeration—the Warriors had Curry, who would have carried them to the top anyway—but the fact remains that Bogut became a crucial part of their puzzle. Monta Ellis left Milwaukee without regret, becoming the face of a failed period. Even fans who initially defended the trade (“Bogut’s always injured anyway,” they’d say) bit their tongues in 2015, seeing Andrew celebrate a championship in Oakland.
Therefore, this trade lands high on the list—we give it spot no. 10. It’s not higher only because Bogut, though great, was a health risk, and Monta at least provided some excitement. But let’s not fool ourselves—it was a disastrous move. The proverb says, “better to lose wisely than gain foolishly.” The Bucks in 2012 did the opposite: they lost foolishly and seemingly gained, but in reality, they lost both. To be fair, Monta Ellis didn’t have it all, and he certainly didn’t have a redeeming impact on the Milwaukee Bucks.
Source: https://www.brewhoop.com/bucks-feat...pj-tucker-jason-kidd-monta-ellis-andrew-bogut
