We’ve been here before.
That’s worth remembering. This is not the first time in the Rafael Stone era that there’s been widespread displeasure with Rafael Stone. It’s familiar territory for Houston Rockets fans.
Specifically, it happens on an annual basis at the NBA Trade Deadline.
To be sure, their recent thrashing at the hands of a Brown-less Celtics squad was aesthetically horrifying. Rockets fans would have done as well to throw on Terrifier.
Early in the season, the notion that Houston’s rebound-focused attack was “gimmicky” was controversial. Now, it’s axiomatic. Anyone should recognize that the Rockets are not going to win at the highest level with this strategy.
The basic recipe to totally shut down the Rockets:
1) Sag way off Thompson and Sengun
2) Press up tight on Durant
3) Victory
https://t.co/pUkH82CFdR
— Andrew Soukup (@asoukuptx)
February 5, 2026
There’s friend of the show (who I believe still reads these?), Andrew Soukup, with a succinct summary of the problem. A pair of non-shooters. For all the high-falutin’ conceptual stuff about dribble hand-offs, cuts from the high post, triangle offense, etc., the reality is that it’s difficult to build a high-powered, portable NBA offense with two non-shooters in the lineup.
So, the roster is flawed. That at least partly reflects on management. Yet, it would be an oversimplification to suggest that putting a flawed roster on the floor singularly characterizes a team’s general manager as “bad”.
Stone has done plenty well during his tenure.
Rockets have drafted well under Stone
Here’s a refrain I’ve heard several times recently:
“Four lottery picks, four whiffs”.
Firstly, Amen Thompson is not a whiff. That’s a consequence of fans overestimating the expected return on a fourth overall pick. He may not be “Russell Westbrook, Defensive Player of the Year model”, but he’s certainly not a whiff. Such an assessment of Reed Sheppard is also absurdly premature.
Otherwise, you can’t judge draft picks in a vacuum. They must be judged in the context of the draft itself.
It’s unfair to knock Stone for taking Jabari Smith Jr. with the third overall pick. The consensus could not have been firmer. There were three dudes in that draft, Bari was the third, and the Rockets had the third pick. All 30 GMs were making the same decision. Stone was not reasonably going to select Jalen Williams. He can’t be retroactively held to a standard of “shock the world or bust”. You’re locking him into a false dichotomy: either he’s a genius or he’s a bad general manager.
By the way, there’s almost nobody else in 2022 you’d rather have. Jaden Ivey just got traded for a Kevin Huerter sandwich with extra Mike Conley. Dyson Daniels is fun, but Houston doesn’t need a 12.7% three-point shooter in their backcourt. Tari Eason has been good…
Oh, wait.
How about 2024? If you wanted Matas Buzelis, gloat – but only a little bit. He’s still got a negative Box Plus/Minus (BPM). He’s racking up basic counting stats for the Bulls, if that counts as an accomplishment. That said, he’s certainly flashed potential, and if you think he’d have been a better choice than Reed Sheppard, you’re beginning to have a valid case. There’s nobody else I can say the same for. It seems unreasonable to come down on Stone because there’s one guy that he maybe (maybe) should have taken over Sheppard.
Then, there’s 2021: A Stone Odyssey. Not good. Bad.
A critical error. The cardinal sin of the rebuild. Evan Mobley was the choice.
I don’t want to hear “they wouldn’t have drafted Alperen Sengun”. OK – so they’d have compounded the error? Sengun and Mobley would be a great fit together.
On the subject of Sengun…
The Rockets had good lottery luck. Paradoxically, they also had bad lottery luck. Statistically, the balls bounced relatively well. In a vacuum, they got lucky.
Contextually, in the four years that the Rockets tanked, the only two lottery picks who’d have materially changed their fortunes were Cade Cunningham and Victor Wembanyama. That is it. Paolo Banchero is a bad fit with Sengun, and he has not been as good as Sengun, so let us not utter his name again.
Mobley and Chet Holmgren are both excellent, but they’re ceiling raisers. It’d be nice to have either, but they wouldn’t fix this team’s systemic issues. For that matter, neither would Wembanyama, but he’s just so special that he’d change the team by virtue of being him.
Otherwise, you’re asking Stone to – well, draw blood from a stone. If anything, the fact that he walked away from the rebuild with Sengun in the fold is a testament to his drafting acumen.
So is Tari Eason. Give most NBA general managers everything Stone had. Most of them don’t walk away with Sengun and Eason. Other than drafting Green, Stone has made no discernible, significant mistakes that could be identified even without the use of hindsight, which is notoriously 20/20.
What about on the trade market?
Stone needs to make some signature trades
Stone’s approach to trading has been…meiserly?
There’s not one deal you can point to and call egregiously bad. It’s just that most of his deals have been in the vein of hey, I’ll give you a non-rotational player for an even worse non-rotational player and a heavily protected second. Stone has made a bevy of moves that you wouldn’t notice whether he made them or not.
He has made one noticeable move. You know the one. How does it look now?
Well, let’s see. The Rockets have practically the same Win Percentage (63.3%) now that they finished last season with (63.4%). Yet, that’s not a fair evaluation of the deal. Last year’s Rockets had Fred VanVleet.
The concept behind the Durant deal was always sound. Opponents were always going to sag off of Sengun and Thompson, as described above, and dare a shot maker to make shots. So, trading one of the worst shot makers in the NBA (sorry, residual Green Gangers) for one of the best ought to build on what was already a formidable squad. Even without VanVleet, that might be bearing out:
If not for the loss of Dillon Brooks.
There was no way to flip Green for Durant without including Brooks (or VanVleet). The money has to money. But the Rockets undeniably miss Brooks. They miss his point of attack defense, his (2024-25) floor spacing, and his tertiary shot creation. They miss his cultural impact.
There should be no referendum on Green. This team was not “better with Green than they are with Durant”. They were better with Green, VanVleet, Brooks, and Steven Adams than they are with Durant. At some point, the raw, aggregate net rating of so many players outweighs even a (post-prime, but still) Durant.
Circling back to the thesis: Stone didn’t injure VanVleet or Adams. He didn’t invent the CBA that required him to include Brooks in that deal. He was never going to let Brooks be the deterrent if he wanted Kevin Durant.
So, Stone’s draft record speaks for itself. The totality of his trade activity seems more positive than negative. Here, we have a defensible GM who’s put a deeply flawed contender on the floor.
How do we square that?
Rockets are a work in progress
The Rockets hold a lot of chips. So, by definition, they’re not all in.
Most of the key rotation players are young. They have a surplus of draft capital. Those are the chips; they aren’t on the table. Analogously, they checked on a small raise by giving up Jalen Green and Khaman Maluach.
So until they’re “all in”, the roster should be treated as an unfinished product. Hypothetically, say the Rockets replace Durant with a lesser version of a shot-creating wing in the draft. Suppose they do the same with any veteran on the roster and otherwise run this exact rotation until the core is in their 30s.
OK. Now, the criticisms are fair.
For now, it’s OK if the roster is flawed. If Stone were to trade either Amen or Sengun and picks for Antetokounmpo this summer, he’d better follow that up by acquiring players who complement Antetokounmpo. The roster can no longer be fundamentally flawed. The Rockets will be all-in.
Let’s see how we feel about Stone then.
